Is Russia an Arctic Status Quo Power? by Nonboe, Morten Larsen
Russian foreign policy in the increasingly impor-
tant Arctic region refl ects an ambiguous combi-
nation of assertiveness and cooperation in accor-
dance with international law. Against this back-
ground, the existing literature on the Arctic tends 
to polarise around revisionist and status quo in-
terpretations of Russian foreign policy in the re-
gion. Based on case studies this article provides 
support for a modifi ed version of the status quo 
interpretation which incorporates insights from 
the revisionist interpretation. 
1. Russia and the Arctic
Th e existing literature on Russian foreign policy in the 
Arctic is divided into two competing camps. One ap-
proach emphasises assertive Russian actions like the Rus-
sian fl ag planting on the seabed beneath the North Pole 
in 2007 and downplays Russia’s adherence to the legal 
framework in the Arctic region whose economic poten-
tial is increasingly highlighted by the eff ects of global 
warming (Borgerson 2008: 65-74, Petersen 2008: 47, 
Baev 2010: 25-26). Ominously, it has been suggested that 
Russia is merely ‘paying lip service to international law’ 
and appears to believe that ‘credible displays of power 
will settle confl icting territorial claims’ in the Arctic (Co-
hen, Szaszdi & Dolbow 2008: 1). Russia’s actions in the 
Arctic have in fact even been linked to a looming ‘New 
Cold War’ between Russia and the West (Lucas 2009: 
186-187). 
Another approach, by contrast, is inclined to dismiss 
assertive Russian actions like the fl ag planting or the 
resumption of Soviet-era strategic bomber fl ight patrols 
over the Arctic Ocean and underlines Russia’s adherence 
to the existing legal framework in the Arctic (Rowe 2009: 
10, Zyśk 2009: 106, Trenin 2010: 10-12, Indzhiyev 2010: 
117-118). Specifi cally, the approach stresses that Russia 
bases its claims in the ice-covered Arctic Ocean on the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 and 
has abrogated the Soviet sector principle according to 
which the Soviet Union unilaterally claimed a triangu-
lar sector between the Soviet Union’s North-eastern and 
North-western borders and the North Pole in 1926 (In-
dzhiyev 2010: 16-20, Kazmin 2010: 15). Th e approach 
also highlights Russia’s participation in the ‘Arctic Five’ 
cooperation with the other Arctic coastal states (Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, and the United States). Th e ‘Arctic 
Five’ cooperation is based on the UNCLOS and was 
formally launched at the Ilulissat Summit in May 2008 
when the ‘Arctic Five’ signed the Ilulissat Declaration and 
committed themselves to an ‘orderly settlement of any 
possible overlapping claims’ based on the existing legal 
framework in the Arctic (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). For 
these reasons, a Russian observer has posited that Rus-
sia’s Arctic policy aims to maintain ‘the status quo in the 
Arctic waters which exists from the Soviet period’ until 
Russia achieves UN recognition of its claims (Golotiuk 
2008: 3). 
Th e divergent interpretations make it relevant to 
study Russian foreign policy in the Arctic in further de-
tail. Drawing on the distinction between the ideal types 
of revisionist and status quo powers in international rela-
tions, the existing literature can be synthesised into revi-
sionist and status quo interpretations. Th e realist premise 
underlying the distinction between revisionist and status 
quo powers suggests that all policies seek to either in-
crease or keep power. Accordingly, a state whose foreign 
policy aims at acquiring more power conducts a revision-
ist foreign policy, while a state whose foreign policy aims 
at maintaining the distribution of power pursues a policy 
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of the status quo (Morgenthau 1973: 40-41). In opera-
tionalisable terms, a state’s attitude towards the rules of 
an international system distinguishes revisionist from 
status quo powers. From this perspective, a revisionist 
power is discernable from a status quo power by its com-
pliance with the existing international institutions and 
the framework of international law (Gilpin 1981: 34-36, 
Johnston 2003: 8-12). Given the importance of the UN-
CLOS in an Arctic context, adherence to the UNCLOS 
therefore constitutes an important indicator of whether 
Russia is best classifi ed as a revisionist power challenging 
the provisions of the UNCLOS or a status quo power 
adhering to the existing legal framework. 
Th e present paper aims to test the competing inter-
pretations through case studies of the Russian fl ag plant-
ing in 2007 and the Ilulissat Summit in 2008 which can 
be treated as ‘crucial cases’ given their centrality to the 
competing interpretations (Eckstein 1975: 113-123, Ger-
ring 2007: 115-122). Th e possibility of testing hypotheses 
using single case studies is disputed for various reasons 
and case studies entail obvious limitations with respect to 
external validity (King, Verba & Keohane 1994: 209-211, 
George, Bennett 2005: 220-222). Th e ‘crucial’ case stud-
ies can, however, be seen as a ‘plausibility probes’ which 
attempt to determine whether the potential validity of the 
competing interpretations may reasonably be considered 
great enough to warrant further inquiry (Eckstein 1975: 
108-109). Th e case studies, accordingly, seek to explore 
the validity of the two competing perspectives on Russian 
foreign policy in the Arctic and do not attempt to give 
a full account of Russia’s Arctic policy which is beyond 
the scope of the paper. Conducting the case studies, the 
paper primarily relies on offi  cial statements from the Rus-
sian government and news coverage of the selected cases.
2. Th e Russian Flag Planting on the North Pole 
Seabed
In the summer of 2007, Russia performed the fi rst ever 
manned descent to the seabed beneath the North Pole. 
Th e descent took place as a part of the expedition Ark-
tika 2007 which was conducted by the Russian research 
vessel Akademik Fyodorov with the help of the icebreaker 
Rossiya. On 2 August 2007, the deep-submergence vehi-
cles MIR-1 and MIR-2 submerged from the Akademik 
Fyodorov in the morning and reached the North Pole sea-
bed around noon. MIR-1 and MIR-2 collected a number 
of specimens from the seabed, but most famously the 
MIR-1 also placed a large Russian titanium fl ag on the 
North Pole seabed (McDowell, Batson 2007: 11-13). Af-
ter the descent, the leader of the expedition, the presi-
dential advisor Artur Chilingarov, forcefully commented 
that ‘there is the law of the sea and there is the right2 
of “the fi rst night” (...) the North Pole belongs to Rus-
sia’ (Moskovskiy komsomolets 2007). Th e fl ag planting 
consequently sparked sharp reactions from the other Arc-
tic coastal states. For instance, then Canadian foreign 
minister Peter MacKay was quoted saying that ‘this isn’t 
the 15th century (…) you can’t go around the world and 
just plant fl ags and say “we’re claiming this territory”’ 
(Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 2007). Against 
this background, the fl ag planting could be seen as a 
revisionist attempt to challenge ‘the rules of the game’ 
in the Arctic based on the UNCLOS. Nonetheless, clas-
sifi cation of the fl ag planting as a revisionist challenge 
of the UNCLOS would seem to depend on the certain 
conditions. Given the operationalisation of a revisionist 
power as a power challenging the existing legal frame-
work based on the UNCLOS, it seems possible to de-
duce the following minimum conditions. First, the fl ag 
planting expedition would have to refl ect continuity with 
Russia’s previous foreign policy in the Arctic. Second, the 
fl ag planting would need to have had an international di-
rection to assert Russia’s claims vis-à-vis the other Arctic 
coastal states. Th ird, high-level decision-makers in Russia 
would need to have welcomed the fl ag planting. What 
follows explores the extent to which the three conditions 
are satisfi ed. 
2.1 Policy continuity
Th e origins of Arktika 2007 are somewhat obscure. Rus-
sia has previously organised similar expeditions known as 
Arktika 2000 and Arktika 2005 in order to collect scienti-
fi c data and prove Russia’s claims within the UNCLOS 
framework (Indzhiyev 2010: 37, ITAR-TASS 2005). Th e 
continuity between Arktika 2007 and Russia’s previous 
foreign policy in the Arctic region has also been stressed 
by the Russian member of the UN Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Yury Kazmin. 
According to Kazmin, ‘the political signifi cance of [the 
fl ag planting] can be hardly overestimated’ since the fl ag 
planting ‘confi rmed that Russia has not abandoned its 
claim to the continental shelf and the resources of the 
seabed up to the North Pole (...) and that she shall never 
revise the limit once outlined’ (Kazmin 2010: 27). Th e 
continuity between Arktika 2007 and Russia’s previous 
foreign policy in the Arctic is, nonetheless, far from per-
fect. In fact, the idea of performing a manned descent 
to the seabed of the North Pole appears to have been 
conceived already in 1997 among a group of internatio-
nal explorers led by the Australian Mike McDowell. Th e 
original idea was to conduct the endeavour as a passenger-
funded expedition using the Russian MIR deep-submer-
gence vehicles, but it proved diffi  cult to fi nd enough pas-
sengers willing to pay for the project. For that reason, the 
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plan did not develop further until the Swedish-German 
businessman Frederik Paulsen joined the project in 2005 
and agreed to ‘funding a signifi cant proportion of the 
costs’ in return for a place in one of the MIR submersi-
bles (McDowell, Batson 2007: 8). Still, the organisers had 
diffi  culties securing icebreakers and the expedition did 
not get underway until the prominent Russian polar ex-
plorer and presidential Arctic representative, Artur Chi-
lingarov, took over the organisation of the logistics and 
used his clout ‘to fund the remaining cost of mounting 
the expedition’ (McDowell, Batson 2007: 9). With the 
assistance of Chilingarov, who is also a deputy speaker 
of the Russian State Duma representing the dominant 
United Russia party, the expedition was authorised by 
the Russian government and approved by the Maritime 
Board under the Russian government. Formally, Arktika 
2007 was organised by the Institute of Oceanography 
under the Russian Academy of Sciences. Th e Institute 
of Oceanography, in turn, delegated the task of carrying 
out the expedition to the non-commercial Russian Polar 
Research Foundation which is established by the Rus-
sian Association of Polar Explorers headed by Chilinga-
rov. Interestingly, though, offi  cials from the Institute of 
Oceanography are reported to have refused to comment 
on the fi nancial sources of the expedition (Current Digest 
of the Post-Soviet Press 2007, ITAR-TASS 2007d, ITAR-
TASS 2007c). All told, the unclear level of government 
involvement in the organisation and funding of Arktika 
2007 suggests that the fi rst condition of policy continuity 
is not satisfi ed.
2.2 Policy Direction
According to Chilingarov, the most important result of 
Arktika 2007 was that ‘we showed that the Arctic is ours, 
the Russian Arctic (…) the Arctic has always been Rus-
sian and will always be Russian’ (Moskovskiy komsomo-
lets 2007). Chilingarov’s words could suggest that the 
fl ag planting had an international direction and aimed 
to challenge the other Arctic coastal states. Chilingarov’s 
statements concerning the purpose of the expedition are, 
however, not entirely consistent. In another interview, 
Chilingarov has simply called Arktika 2007 ‘a geographic 
expedition’ whose main goal was the descent to the North 
Pole seabed (Moskovskiye novosti 2007). Moreover, Ark-
tika 2007 incorporated a number of symbols relating to 
the dominant United Russia party which seem superfl u-
ous outside a Russian context. Apart from Chilingarov, 
United Russia was represented by another State Duma 
member, Vladimir Gruzdev, who was also onboard the 
MIR-1 when the Russian fl ag was placed on the North 
Pole seabed. Th e MIR-1 also left a time capsule on the 
seabed which contained a United Russia banner. Th e lead-
ing United Russia member and head of the International 
Aff airs Committee in the Russian Federation Council, 
Mikhail Margelov, publicly welcomed the capsule with 
the United Russia banner as ‘an excellent PR move by his 
party colleagues’ (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 
2007). Th e domestic direction of Arktika 2007 is also 
indicated by the fact that assertive Arctic endeavours have 
resonance among the Russian public according to opin-
ion polls. More than 70 percent of the respondents in one 
poll, for example, had an ‘encouraging attitude’ towards 
Arktika 2007, while 90 percent had no doubts as to the 
legitimacy of a Russian claim to the North Pole (ITAR-
TASS 2007a). Th e references to United Russia suggest a 
domestic purpose which is diffi  cult to combine with the 
second condition of an international direction to assert 
Russia’s claims vis-à-vis the other Arctic coastal states. 
2.3 High-level reactions
Arktika 2007 might have developed outside the tradi-
tional channels of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic, 
but the Russian authorities quickly embraced the project 
once the descent to the North Pole seabed was success-
fully carried out (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 
2007). Th en President Putin, for example, personally 
phoned the participants shortly after the descent to con-
gratulate them (ITAR-TASS 2007c, ITAR-TASS 2007b). 
Th e praise from President Putin was seconded by similar 
statements from other prominent Russian offi  cials like 
the speaker of the State Duma and leading member of 
United Russia, Boris Gryzlov (ITAR-TASS 2007e). Even 
the Russian Patriarch at the time, Aleksiy II, welcomed 
the descent, commenting that Arktika 2007 was a historic 
event which had ‘enhanced Russia’s prestige’ (Kolodkin, 
Glandin 2007: 15). As another sign of high-level sup-
port, Chilingarov was invited for a private meeting at 
the presidential residence upon his return to Russia and 
was told that the expedition members had ‘accomplished 
a great deed for our state’ (Moscow News 2008). In Jan-
uary 2008, the high-level support was reiterated when 
President Putin signed a decree awarding the title Hero 
of the Russian Federation to the crew members of the 
MIR-1 ‘for the courage and heroism they showed under 
extreme conditions and the successfully conducted opera-
tion’ (ITAR-TASS 2008a).
Th e enthusiastic offi  cial response to Arktika 2007 
notwithstanding, however, high-level Russian offi  cials 
have also been cautious not to link the fl ag planting to 
Russia’s claims in the Arctic. At the meeting with Chilin-
garov at the presidential residence, for instance, Presi-
dent Putin explicitly stressed that the results obtained by 
Arktika 2007 should become the basis of Russia’s stand 
during future discussions with the other Arctic coastal 
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states. In the words of President Putin, ‘the fact that the 
ranges are the continuation of the Russian shelf should 
be discussed with scientists (…) we should prove it at 
international organisations’ (ITAR-TASS 2008a). Shortly 
after awarding the Hero of the Russian Federation titles 
to the MIR-1 crew members, President Putin also made 
it clear that Russia is collecting evidence in the Arctic 
precisely because Russia wants to ensure ‘an open and 
objective dialogue’ and that Russia will continue its work 
‘within the framework of existing international proce-
dures’ (Shaverdov 2008: 110). Similarly, the fl ag planting 
has been downplayed by the Russian Foreign Minister, 
Sergey Lavrov, who has compared the fl ag planting to 
the American fl ag on the Moon and argued that Arktika 
2007 was part of ‘the extensive work that is based on the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (Kolodkin, Glandin 
2007: 15). During the Ilulissat Summit in May 2008, 
Foreign Minister Lavrov made the same point, explicitly 
denying that the fl ag planting signals a Russian claim 
to the North Pole. In Foreign Minister Lavrov’s words, 
Russia does not ‘and cannot have any claims to that ter-
ritory (…) there is the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and a mechanism of its fulfi lment, which also 
concerns the issue of the continental shelf ’ (ITAR-TASS 
2008b). Th e third condition is consequently only par-
tially fulfi lled since the enthusiastic high-level reactions 
are accompanied by reassurances of Russia’s adherence 
to the UNCLOS.
Overall, the case study of the Russian fl ag planting 
challenges the explanatory power of the revisionist inter-
pretation. Nonetheless, the disharmony between Chilin-
garov’s forceful rhetoric and the offi  cial policy line advo-
cated by the presidential administration and the foreign 
ministry suggests that the revisionist interpretation can-
not be rejected entirely. For that reason, the second case 
study delves into the Ilulissat Summit in 2008 to test the 
status quo interpretation in further detail. 
3. Th e Ilulissat Summit
In May 2008, the fi ve Arctic coastal states gathered in 
the Greenlandic town of Ilulissat to discuss the future 
of the Arctic region. Th e two-day conference offi  cially 
known as the Arctic Ocean Conference took place on 
27-29 May 2008 and resulted in the Ilulissat Declara-
tion which was widely seen as defusing the Arctic con-
fl ict potential. Explicitly mentioning the UNCLOS, the 
Ilulissat Declaration notes that ‘an extensive international 
legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean’ and that the 
‘Arctic Five’ remain ‘committed to this legal framework 
and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping 
claims’ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Against this back-
ground, Russia’s participation at the Ilulissat Summit fi ts 
in well with the status quo interpretation. Even so, clas-
sifi cation of Russia as a status quo power on the basis 
of the Ilulissat Summit would also seem to depend on 
certain basic conditions. Given the operationalisation of 
a status quo power as a power adhering to the existing 
legal framework based on the UNCLOS, the follow-
ing minimum conditions can be deduced. First, a sta-
tus quo interpretation would depend on evidence of a 
positive Russian engagement before the summit. Second, 
the fi ndings would have to reveal a constructive Russian 
behaviour during the summit. Th ird, Russia would need 
to have communicated its participation domestically and 
internationally following the summit. 
3.1 Pre-summit Engagement
Th e Ilulissat Summit was convened ‘at the invitation of 
the Danish Minister for Foreign Aff airs and the Premier 
of Greenland’ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Th e summit 
emerged as a continuation of an informal brain-storming 
session among the ‘Arctic Five’ which Norway hosted 
in Oslo in October 2007 and the invitations for the Il-
ulissat Summit were issued only after informal consul-
tations with Norway (Petersen 2008: 56). Russia, by 
contrast, was not directly involved in the preparations 
for the Ilulissat Summit, but has by and large supported 
the launch of ‘Arctic Five’ cooperation. In Oslo, for in-
stance, Russia’s representatives noted the applicability of 
an extensive international legal framework to the Arctic 
Ocean including the UNCLOS and emphasised Rus-
sia’s commitment to continued cooperation in the Arctic 
(Norwegian Foreign Ministry 2007). Russia also acted in 
a cooperative way during the preparations for the Ilulis-
sat Summit. In January 2008, for example, the Danish 
government presented the participating states with a dis-
cussion paper which noted the adequacy of the existing 
legal framework. Russia accepted the discussion paper 
and was particularly satisfi ed with an explicit reference 
to the UNCLOS (Petersen 2008: 59-61). Russia’s coop-
eration during the initial preparations for the Ilulissat 
Summit was followed by a highly proactive engagement 
immediately before the summit. Notably, the Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Copenhagen on his way 
to Greenland (Rossiyskaya gazeta 2008). According to 
a Russian newspaper, Foreign Minister Lavrov aimed to 
reassure his Danish colleague of Russia’s cooperative at-
titude in advance, downplaying Russia’s assertive moves 
in the Arctic and emphasising the importance of the UN-
CLOS (Vremia novostey 2008). On the whole, the evi-
dence relating to Russia’s pre-summit engagement would 
therefore seem to fulfi l the fi rst condition. 
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3.2 Behaviour during the Summit
Th e actual negotiations of the Ilulissat Summit took place 
on 28 May 2008. Th e fi rst half of the day was devoted 
to less disputed matters like the eff ects of climate change 
and issues pertaining to indigenous peoples in the Arctic. 
Afterwards, the controversial issue of Arctic sovereignty 
was discussed during the second half of the day (Rossiy-
skaya gazeta 2008). Th e level of diplomatic representa-
tion constitutes an instructive starting point when ex-
amining Russia’s behaviour during the summit. Russia 
has historically been very conscious about parity in the 
level of diplomatic representation in general and parity 
with the United States in particular. Russia’s particular 
emphasis on the relationship with the United States is 
clearly refl ected by the fact that Foreign Minister Lav-
rov held bilateral talks with the US Deputy Secretary of 
State, John Negroponte, on the sidelines of the summit 
(Russian Foreign Ministry 2008a). For these reasons, it 
is worth noting that Russia like Denmark and Norway 
was represented by its foreign minister, whereas Canada 
was represented by the Canadian Minister for Natural 
Resources and the United States was represented at the 
level of Deputy Secretary of State. While the absence of 
the Canadian Foreign Minister refl ected his resignation 
on the eve of the summit, the lower level of American rep-
resentation appears to have been a conscious choice. Rus-
sian observers, in any case, note that the representative of 
the United States was a less infl uential fi gure and the rep-
resentation by a ‘secondary fi gure’ is seen as an indication 
that the United States did not attach great importance 
to the summit (Kommersant 2008, Usviatsov 2009: 4). 
Th e presence of Foreign Minister Lavrov at the summit 
despite the level of American representation suggests a 
constructive Russian behaviour insofar as Russia could 
have sent one of Russia’s eight Deputy Foreign Minis-
ters of whom one is primarily responsible for multilateral 
diplomacy and climate change related issues (Russian 
Foreign Ministry 2010). In that way, Russia could have 
given the impression of complying with the framework of 
international law and maintained diplomatic parity with 
the United States simultaneously. 
Th e congruence between Russia’s offi  cial position at 
the summit and the wording of the Ilulissat Declaration 
also indicates a constructive Russian behaviour. Th e min-
utes of the negotiations are not publicly accessible, but the 
Russian position is refl ected by a speech which Foreign 
Minister Lavrov gave at the summit. In the speech, For-
eign Minister Lavrov emphasised the common interests 
uniting the Arctic coastal states and avoided reference 
to extra-regional actors like Finland, Iceland, and Swe-
den which are also members of the Arctic Council, but 
do no border directly on the Arctic Ocean. Specifi cally, 
Foreign Minister Lavrov made it clear that Russia did 
not share ‘alarmist prognoses’ of a future ‘battle for the 
Arctic’ (Lavrov 2008b). Instead, he explicitly stressed the 
importance of the UNCLOS and concluded by noting 
how the Arctic is becoming ‘our common home’, echo-
ing Gorbachev’s vision of a ‘common European home’ 
(Lavrov 2008b).
Russia’s focus on the Arctic coastal states and the ex-
isting legal framework based on the UNCLOS is clearly 
refl ected in the fi nal wording of the Ilulissat Declaration. 
Th e declaration repeatedly refers to ‘the fi ve coastal states’ 
and their special status in the Arctic and makes a clear 
distinction between the coastal states and ‘other inter-
ested parties’ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Moreover, in 
keeping with the Russian position, the Ilulissat Declara-
tion emphasises the existing framework of international 
law and explicitly mentions the UNCLOS (Ilulissat Dec-
laration 2008). Th e level of Russian representation and 
the congruence between Russia’s offi  cial position and the 
fi nal wording of the Ilulissat Declaration would seem to 
satisfy the second condition of a constructive Russian 
behaviour during the summit.
3.3 Communication
Immediately after the summit, Foreign Minister Lavrov 
spoke at a joint press conference with the other partici-
pants. At the conference, Foreign Minister Lavrov called 
the results of the summit ‘substantial and useful’ and 
added that the summit ‘showed that we have common 
interests’ (Lavrov 2008a). Notably, the Ilulissat Declara-
tion was said to refl ect the resolve of all the participants to 
solve all potential problems ‘on the basis of international 
law’ (Lavrov 2008a). 
Th e day after the summit, the Russian Foreign Min-
istry issued a short press release on the results of the Arc-
tic Ocean Conference. Th e press release mentioned the 
intent of expanding cooperation among the Arctic states 
and the commitment to legal solutions of any disputes 
(Russian Foreign Ministry 2008b). Th e press release was 
also published in English and French versions which were 
clearly addressed at an international audience. On the 
contrary, it has not been possible to identify evidence of 
similar domestic communication apart from the Russian 
version of the press release. Likewise, few domestic ac-
tors seem to have commented on Russia’s participation 
at the summit. 
Again, however, the presidential representative Artur 
Chilingarov stands out. After the summit, Chilingarov 
publicly refuted Foreign Minister Lavrov’s remarks that 
Russia has no claims to the North Pole, saying that For-
eign Minister Lavrov ‘speaks as a diplomat’ (Kommersant 
2008). Chilingarov stated that Russia did not need to 
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negotiate further but should simply continue working to-
wards proving its claims. Moreover, Chilingarov warned 
against waiting until other countries arrive at the North 
Pole and urged that Russia should summon strength and 
‘do everything to see that Russia grows through the addi-
tion of the North Pole’ (Kommersant 2008). Th e attempt 
to downplay the importance of the Ilulissat Summit is 
diffi  cult to overlook considering Chilingarov’s close links 
with the presidential administration and United Russia. 
Th e scarce and rather ambiguous communication of the 
Ilulissat Summit therefore provides little support for the 
status quo interpretation and suggests that internal dis-
harmony remains a feature of Russian foreign policy in 
the Arctic. 
Overall, though, the case study of Russia’s participa-
tion at the Ilulissat Summit provides signifi cant support 
for a status quo interpretation of Russian foreign policy 
in the Arctic. 
4. Conclusion
Status quo and revisionist interpretations both capture 
important elements of Russian foreign policy in the Arc-
tic. On the one hand, in keeping with the status quo 
interpretation, the case studies show that the UNCLOS 
enjoys considerable support within the presidential ad-
ministration and the Russian foreign ministry which 
favour international cooperation in the Arctic. Recent 
events provide additional support for a status quo in-
terpretation of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic. In 
March 2010, for instance, Russia confi rmed the support 
for the existing legal framework at the ‘Arctic Five’ fol-
low-up summit in Canada where the ‘Arctic Five’ reiter-
ated their commitment to an orderly resolution of over-
lapping claims ‘within the extensive international legal 
framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean’ (Canadian 
Foreign Ministry 2010). Th e following month, Russia 
and Norway fi nally agreed to resolve a long-standing dis-
pute over the maritime border in the Barents Sea (Trenin 
2010: 10). Russia’s adherence to the UNCLOS was once 
again demonstrated when the Akademik Fyodorov sailed 
off  from St Petersburg in July 2010 to gather additional 
data to substantiate Russia’s claims within the UNCLOS 
framework (ITAR-TASS 2010a). Most recently, Russian 
Prime Minister Putin told an international audience in 
Moscow in September 2010 that he had ‘absolutely no 
doubt that the existing Arctic problems (…) could be 
solved in the spirit of partnership through negotiations 
and on the basis of the existing norms of international 
law’ (Putin 2010). 
On the other hand, the assertiveness emphasised by 
revisionist interpretations highlights the fact that Russia 
is not a unitary actor. Th e forceful rhetoric from Chilin-
garov demonstrates the existence of more assertive views 
on the Arctic which the Russian leadership sometimes 
seems to accommodate. Remarkably, even Chilingarov 
has recently moved to emphasise Russia’s adherence to 
the UNCLOS following the commotion in connection 
with the fl ag planting (Moscow News 2008, ITAR-TASS 
2010b). Chilingarov is, however, not the only proponent 
of an assertive Russian stance in the Arctic. Notably, 
the commander in chief of the Russian navy, Admiral 
Vladimir Vysotskiy, has warned that while there is pres-
ently peace and stability in the Arctic a power-based re-
vision up to the point of armed intervention cannot be 
excluded in the future (Usviatsov 2009: 3). Noting an in-
crease in the military activities of the NATO members in 
the Arctic, the secretary of the Russian Security Council 
and former director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), 
Nikolai Patrushev, has similarly urged that Russia should 
‘take action now’ to prevent NATO members from driv-
ing Russia away from the Arctic (Zyśk 2009: 118). 
A modifi ed version of the status quo interpretation 
incorporating revisionist insights would therefore sug-
gest that Russia is an Arctic status quo power seeking 
international cooperation despite some domestic support 
for an assertive stance which can explain the existence of 
revisionist interpretations.
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Notes
1. Th e UNCLOS specifi es the conditions under which coastal states 
can claim an outer continental shelf beyond a 200-nautical-mile 
exclusive economic zone which is automatically stipulated in the 
UNCLOS (Colson 2003: 92-94, Kunoy 2007: 465-470). Russia 
ratifi ed the UNCLOS in 1997 and became the fi rst state to submit 
a claim within the UNCLOS framework for an outer continental 
shelf in the Arctic to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Con-
tinental Shelf (CLCS) in 2001. Th e CLCS rejected Russia’s initial 
claim because of inadequate scientifi c evidence, but Russia has been 
gathering more data ever since in order to submit a new claim in 
2013 or 2014 (Kazmin 2010: 27-28).
2. Th e word ’pravo’ both means ’law’ and ‘right’ in Russian.
